Originally Posted by
Mach E Avelli
The armchair experts at the ATSB should butt out on this one.
It is apparent from the report that the PIC was well aware of the risks, possible mitigations and how best to manage workload during an abnormal event. The crew displayed good CRM and the PIC had (rare) empathy for the health of the remaining engine.
Consider that by the time they identified and dealt with the problem, completed all checklists, attempted a relight and re-secured the dud engine they would have been about a third of the way to destination. It is only a 200nm sector. It would not be usual to start a turn-back or diversion until all the abnormal procedures had been completed. You'd look like a goose if the relight had been successful (now where should we go?), and any diversion from the planned track is workload best avoided until priority activites are completed.
With a situation nicely under control, turning back to an uncontrolled airport with a less easy 2D approach and fewer emergency facilities versus a straight-in 3D approach to an international airport and two other military aerodromes close to on-track is a no-brainer.
As for the ATSB comments about OEI climb speeds and maximum OEI altitude; really this is nit-picking. If weather, terrain or range are not limiting, the pilot should be free to select whatever provides adequate performance. Lower and faster is often safer than nibbling at the limits of the envelope.
Well done that crew, I say.
^
I agree with everything you have said. I truly wonder whether the ATSB actually employs any experienced ex-airline pilots