Bloggs, Thanks, #100
I have fallen foul of my own criticism of using incomplete or summarised, third party accident reporting.
I will reconsider the technical issues in the report, but initial reaction is that for most aircraft the control check is a true check, but there are still some which are not - grandfather rights (DC 9 - MD80).
For this thread, the 737 airbrake detent - Takeoff Config Warning; some aircraft better than others, where this 737 required special maintenance procedures, with additional risk of error.
The MD83 crew faced a no-win situation; something which the industry should not tolerate.
The contributing factors were avoidable providing later safety standards had been applied; they were not. Thus the safety responsibility - these who should bear the risk, lies with the regulators and manufacturers, not those last in the chain of events, the 'crew'.
The time history indicates a 7 sec period between Rotate and the Abort call; a measure of the difficulty in assessing the situation and deciding what to do.
No dispersions on the MD crew, they acted as they saw the situation, but for those in this thread who believe that it is possible to have instant awareness and decision making in these situations should reconsider human behaviour, particularly in rare and surprising situations.
This also applies to those who write SOPs, what is imagined to occur vs reality; who knew of the limitations of the control check.
It is better to consider the SOPs for RTO as only applying up to V1; thereafter Go.
There will be situational exceptions above V1, but not sufficiently imaginable for a SOP - nothing is Standard.
In these rare circumstances, requiring pilot judgement, the mindset should consider the action of stopping as only to reduce the effects an accident.