To focus solely on the reason for the RTO is not seeing the entire picture.
There has been a lot of back and forth on this thread and from my POV, posts that seem more directed at "winning" the argument than contributing to expanding understanding of what and more importantly WHY this event happened.
I like reading PPRUNE because there are often ideas expressed that force me to challenge my assumptions on important issues. And numerous times I have been forced to reconsider things I thought were obvious and not worthy of debate.
B2N2's, quote above, to me, really summarizes the issue.
When I first read the report I have to admit my first thought " Oh Yah some third world crap airline went off the runway after they totally pooched the RTO and this would never happen to me", then I thought of a takeoff I did at Terrace British Columbia (CYXT) one really, really nasty night. We had a long discussion about getting out of the valley if various bad things happened but they were all considerations for after we got airborne. The part from max power to V2 was just the standard brief. I remember letting go of the brakes after the stable power call and thinking only about getting safely out of the valley. I like to think if a similar issue ( i was not flying a 737) had occurred I would have acted perfectly but thinking back I am now not so sure. You can be mentally behind the airplane but you can also be mentally too far ahead of the airplane.
From a human factors POV I think this was a significant factor in this incident. Combine the mental model the captain had at the beginning of the takeoff roll flying out of a very challenging airport, with evidence of incomplete/poor training and you have this result. Even in reputable Western airlines there has been constant pressure to reduce training costs which has IMO led to a very tick the box culture developing in sim training sessions. So if all the boxes are ticked the pilot must be fully trained, right ? This would never happen to a us flying for a real airline, right ?
Finally I think it is worthwhile to acknowledge that after the aircraft came to a stop there was some good CRM happening. This could easily have turned into a full evacuation with probable injuries if he FO had not made some good recommendation to the Captain which the Captain accepted.
The take away for me, and I think it is important to note this is a personal take away not advocacy for a particular action as the "right way" to do things; Is a reinforcement that regardless of the situation, when the power levers go up the importance of having my brain engaged totally on what is happening from now to Vr, not on what might happen later in the departure.