Originally Posted by
silverstrata
And if this authority was so easily reduced in the revised Max, then why was this not specified for the original Max? Were there occasional conditions where the system needed full trim authority (for a high-speed stall perhaps), and they are not telling us about it?
My bet would be that with the grounding, Boeing would focus on this sole issue much more than they did during the development of the aircraft.
Originally Posted by
silverstrata
c. A manual stab-trimmer that becomes mechanically locked if the pilots are pulling back on the control column - so that no manual re-trimming is possible.
Because in normal and large majority of abnormal situations there is no requirement for trimming in the opposite direction of control column, as this would just cause the out-of-trim condition, that could lead to aircraft being uncontrollable. There is an override switch available on the aft pedestal that disables this feature, if situation requires it.
Originally Posted by
silverstrata
d. An anti-stall device (MCAS) that operates on the stab-trimmer, rather than the control column. Look, dear Boeing, the design and mechanics of an anti-stall device are well-known, ever since the Bae Trident got into trouble. The solution is to push the control column forward, because once the nose is lowered and speed increases, the pressure can be released instantly.
MCAS is not an anti-stall device, it's a feature of the FCC to ensure stick force gradient remains positive at high AoA.
Originally Posted by
silverstrata
f. Important warnings, like low engine oil pressure, that simply don’t appear on the master warning system. It does not take too much in the way of distractions or inattention to miss the fact that the engine is about to seize.
That's true, but with low oil pressure caution (right next to N1 readings which hopefully we scan here and there), you'd also get a lower DU pop-up, which serves as another attention-getter.
Originally Posted by
silverstrata
h. Engine overheat and fire warning lights that are not in the pilot’s line of sight, with no repeater lights on the thrust levers.
Engine overheat generates a master caution, which is directly in front of each pilot, so is the fire warning light, which also has an audible warning as well. Later NGs and all MAX aircraft have modern thrust levers with fire warning lights incorporated in them, to aid identification of engine which is on fire.
Originally Posted by
silverstrata
. Paper checklists and emergency checklists. Now come on guys and gals, computer checklists were common back in the 80s, so why the hell are we still operating with bits of crumpled and torn paper?
Even the most modern aircraft still have fairly thick QRH, despite all the bells and whistles. Some operators do have approved electronic QRH solution for 737 though.
Originally Posted by
silverstrata
m. Center fuel pumps in the center tank, which can overheat and explode - and no auto-switching system was devised to prevent this. Has this been solved on the Max, because it was a butcher’s bin on the NG?
That's been fixed in 2004 or so with an auto shutoff if the pumps are left on. Nevertheless, you do have to switch them off when the tank is empty. Luckily, that's only once per (longer) flight, so hardly a big deal.
Sure, 737 is an old design, but it's still fit for purpose. I do hope the MAX is the last iteration, so Boeing can focus on building something state-of-the-art.