I almost started this thread after reading the BBC 'paper' on my FireFox tab. I didn't because it was filled with a LOT of technical misinformation. In particular, they'd gone to the trouble of nose angle drawings but as was so often the case, got muddled with simple pitch and AoA measurements.
Many of the statements were entirely familiar to me. This is happening at a time when Boeing know they can't have another MCAS induced incident, and now they have an entirely new incident to start a lot of heads nodding. There are some striking similarities, but hopefully not a single causal factor that is the same.
We all know pretty much what happened. What we seem to let slip into dark corners of our memories is that the two vanes failed in disparate ways. To me, this spells a very high bad luck factor in the equation. The second crash might well have been avoided had there been time, or the inclination, to practice such an occurrence after the first crash. However, it's been mooted that the psychology at that moment was probably worsened - now having the awareness of some mystery system causing problems but nowhere near enough thought and training on how to handle it. i.e., the limited knowledge causing a greater feeling of disbelief and resultant stress.
There are many factors that take some of the share of blame, though such arguments become almost philosophic.
IIRC, The first vane had been sourced from FLA from a company that sells and or refurbishes parts. If this is true, a virtually new late-model Boeing had a critical part that was not only not new, but had been serviced (then) by an unknown. Service might mean nothing more than bench testing.