"It's not things that upset us, but our judgments about things"
George, #12, agree, except we cannot know that the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly.
Previous QRH items are fact; 'unsafe', 'unable' are … unknowable.
Yes, it's the Captains call, judgement, but what is judgement … .
Hindsight is the gap between an event and subsequent analysis.
Surprise is when fear overcomes fact.
Fear is also when we are unable define every situation before the event. Its these which we should 'fear' before the event, think about how we react to uncertainty in situations.
After the event 'fact' is only opinion; a forum post, a realisation that we had not thought about these situations beforehand. Alternatively with prior thought, not having considered every aspect, so there is still opportunity to learn.
Reduced safety margin when rejecting on a wet, downhill, rubber contaminated runway.
Uplinker,#11.
Our finest hour always precedes the outcome, but no-one knows that.
Config Warning is a difficult case, but the settings and alerting were correct at the start of the roll.
Certification requirements are (statistically) sufficient to eliminate false activation thereafter. We trust requirements in other instances, so why think otherwise in these situations; 'otherwise' involves surprise, lack of knowledge, biased training.
For those who change control for an RTO, consider the time taken; a further reduction in the available stopping distance.
This is a good safety investigation; but where is the strong recommendation that the manufacturer should improve the detent (> recc 4.5, 4.6). How many events are required, how many accidents …