I think this has all been done to death on other threads but it is worth reiterating the simple facts.
- MCAS was created to meet certification requirements of control column pitch force at the extreme edge of the performance envelope.
99.999 % of Pilots in normal operations would never expect to get anywhere near those conditions in 99.999 % of their total time on the aircraft.
- The inadequacy of the design was exposed ONLY after two subsequent events occurred;
- an angle of attack sensor failure
PLUS
- the incorrect application of the Non- Normal checklists expected by Boeing to resolve the issue.
Boeings assumption was that the procedures it had in place were adequate to mitigate the risk.
Subsequent events proved them wrong.
But not unreasonably so.
Took lots of cheese slices to line up to reach the outcome.
Last edited by George Glass; 14th Jan 2021 at 07:20.