As for the operational support, that must have been quite a surprise that battlefield helicopters would be tasked largely by the Army in field conditions
Don't know if the sentiment is still current in the Army, but the feeling at the time was that the Army wanted the helos to be under their control and not the RAAF was the result of the RAAF refusing to provide support (provide ammo drop) when the battle of Long Tan took place where the troops were at risk of being wiped out for lack of ammo. The RAAF were under orders from the top in Canberra that the aircraft/crews were not to be exposed to hazardous conditions, hence the RAAF adviser in task headquarters saying no dice, stating that he would have to get permission from Canberra. Following the refusal the US Army accepted the task. It's not clear if the RAAF adviser relented or if the pilot, Frank Riley, made the decision to go, he insisted on providing support and would go by himself if necessary. The co-pilot said he thought it was a suicide mission and in interview said, "It was insanity. I felt petrified. I tried to talk Riley out of it, Frank said shut up, stop giving me the ****s". Two aircraft went and suitable decorated for their actions.