Air Marshal Brown, who served as air force chief from 2011 to 2015, said the MRH-90 and ARH were demanding European designs and posed difficult logistical challenges, which meant they would never approach the serviceability of US-made helicopters such as the Blackhawk.
That's quite an indictment of the Australian acquisition system, essentially saying the logistics and supportability elements were either ignored or took a lower priority over something much shinier. As for the operational support, that must have been quite a surprise that battlefield helicopters would be tasked largely by the Army in field conditions! Don't worry, the UK has had this particular pissing contest for many decades, the advent of JHC fixed some problems and created others. Crew rest is a complete red herring - yes it's unacceptable to incur accidents during peacetime training due to fatigue and tiredness, but I'm fairly sure the Helmand Hilton did not have a special quiet suite for sensitive aircrew types. "Fight as you train, train how you fight", is a tired trope, but it is still as true today as it ever was.
The good Air Marshall sounds like at an operational level he is trying to treat the symptoms of a much deeper underlying condition at the procurement and acquisition level. Putting critical military capability where it can be supported rather than where it's needed, seems remarkably short-sighted.