Willow, #591, although the US is reforming regulation, the dominant issue is with the application of existing processes; i.e. the triple layered safety processes of design, checking, and certification - all 'failed' - within Boeing and specifically the FAA.
With that, what confidence (trust) is there that processes will be correctly followed now, and how is this to be checked. Regulations 'require', but who acts.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? "Who will watch the watchmen?"; government has a role, but would not be expected to understand the detail. Thus at some point the FAA / Boeing management has to understand the detail or accept the views of those who do, but where is the dividing line, who draws it, who judges; will there be change. (
https://www.smart-jokes.org/everybod...nd-nobody.html)
Deep rooted beliefs are difficult to change. One aspect is the FAA and Boeings' view of human contribution in aircraft operation.
At some point before the second Max accident it was concluded that the type remained "safe"; both FAA and Boeing being 'data driven' organisations, statistics, computer assessment, attempting to define human behaviour as a numerical value. Thus safety was misjudged, based on inappropriate models of the human, and influenced by flawed analysis of a previous successful outcome where a Max crew switched the trim off.
The FAA concluded that this 'average crew' would be representative of all crews; except that the event had three people vice the normal certified two crew (FAA apparently did appreciate this !), and that the concept of 'an average crew' is meaningless, a conundrum which other areas of certification avoid.
FAA and Boeing need a fundamental change in their view of human contribution in safety; a very difficult task; and who would check that.