So my bottom line is that the general public, those that died in the XV256 accident and their families were denied an open independent public inquiry, along with all the ‘checks and balances’ that brings. This accident marked the beginning of the ‘collusion’ between the MoD and the Crown Office of Scotland with regards to military accident investigation in Scotland, and that is why it is important. The root cause of that ‘collusion’ had an impact for the next 40 years and still presents an obstacle to the legal completion of 2012 Moray Firth Tornado collision inquiry.
Just to be clear, I don't disagree with the the general thrust of your point and I support your cause of "legal alignment", if I've put that correctly. Not sure about the "collusion" bit...it's a strong word and therefore would require equally strong evidence. You may well have it...please don't take that as an invitation to post it...I'm sure you've done that elsewhere
and whilst I support your cause, for me this would be a secondary platform to discuss it. All of which has already been said, just wanted to make my support clear, before I go and look like I'm contradicting it.
My reasons for continuing posting are multiple. I have a connection through close friendship with the crew. I was on the Sqn. I served on the aircraft - at Kinloss - my entire career, and although I am no longer a professional aviator of any description, flight safety is in my DNA and I, along with probably 99% of all professional aviators, believe accident reports should exist primarily for the purpose of education and accident prevention (and not just in aviation). I am not naive..aircraft accident reports will of course get mixed up in legal due process in all sorts of ways, such is life. But that is not, and never should be, their primary function.
So with all that said (phew long preamble, sorry
)
Several interesting statements are locked away in the recently acquired copy of the BOI report;
(1) The loss of XV 256 indicated that there was a failure to appreciate the true hazard, and that such a lack of appreciation extended beyond Station level.
(2) A recommendation from the Aviation Bird Unit had not been made known to RAF Kinloss.
(3) The Bird Control Unit at RAF Kinloss was not manned to cover hours of darkness, despite several requests by the station to increase the manning level.
(4) Bird control during hours of darkness consisted of a 'quiet' run down the runway by an ATC assistant in a land rover.
(5) The NCO i/c the BCU had expressed concerns in a paper, dated 26th Oct 1980, that the 'quite' run was in fact disturbing birds which were not on the runway and thus increasing bird strike risk.
I'm not keen on the suggestion of "locked away". Everything you listed was very well known at Kinloss, both before and after the accident. RAF aircrew of the period (and probably still now - I don't know) were are all highly trained in all aspects of airmanship and flight safety. And by all, I mean the entire cadre, not just the pilots. All bird activity at Kinloss was discussed, chewed over. debated etc endlessly. I'm not entirely sure, but I don't think the whole concept of the Bird Control Unit has been around for many years previous to the accident in question...it was, and no doubt still is, all part of a rolling and continuous progression of improvement and development in all aspects of operational flight safety which continued throughout my career and one assumes continues still.
And of course the hazard of bird strike is just one tiny little piece of the huge jigsaw. There were any number of risks that we were fully aware with inherent in our job, and any number of which could have claimed us. I can't speak of all RAF aircrew, but I'm guessing most of us approached the risk in our chosen profession professionally and philosophically and then got on with it.
So lets be clear, RAF aircrew are not uninformed about any "visible" aspect of flight safety...ever. This accident occurred because of a hazard, that was 100% visible, well known and much discussed. Substantial risk mitigation was in place and was being continously improved. Whether or not it had been mitigated sufficiently is a valid cause for endless debate, of that I concur, but lets not forget there is only way to prevent all aircraft accidents and that is to cease flying. My point is this particular accident was transparent in every repect. The hazard was known by all. The hazard was mitigated by sensible measures. The remaining risk was accepted by those that undertook the task and the accident happened. Subsequently, lessons were learnt and applied.
Complex legal issues aside, from an aircraft accident perspective there is no "fog of war" here, and there never was. All that occurred was accurately, comprehensively and transparently known by all that needed to know at the time and ever since.