Several interesting statements are locked away in the recently acquired copy of the BOI report;
(1) The loss of XV 256 indicated that there was a failure to appreciate the true hazard, and that such a lack of appreciation extended beyond Station level.
(2) A recommendation from the Aviation Bird Unit had not been made known to RAF Kinloss.
(3) The Bird Control Unit at RAF Kinloss was not manned to cover hours of darkness, despite several requests by the station to increase the manning level.
(4) Bird control during hours of darkness consisted of a 'quiet' run down the runway by an ATC assistant in a land rover.
(5) The NCO i/c the BCU had expressed concerns in a paper, dated 26th Oct 1980, that the 'quite' run was in fact disturbing birds which were not on the runway and thus increasing bird strike risk.
DV