From what I understand, the PIC had to perform two go arounds and was emotionnally messed up. He had to push forcefully on the control column (he did not trim down at the first stage of the go around) and he looked like he went tired of this and eventually put way too much down trim.
To me, this is another illustration of the importance of ergonomics.
Surely, the captain failed to control his aircraft. But with an airbus, the captain would not have been disturbed by very large stick forces, even in alternate law and trim failure, because of the sidestick having a constant force feedback
KP I can't believe what you said.There's no feedback constant or otherwise on the Airbus side stick. It's just the spring pressure to bring the stick to neutral. Airbus maintains 1g when stick free so for a GA if you don't pull up there's a small pitch up at TOGA rarely exceeds 7to8 degrees. You need to pull up to 15° otherwise she will accelerate. The B737 has a large pitch up from TOGA that's why in a GA the pull if any quickly changes to push to prevent excessive pitch up. This Fly Dubai accident could have happened simply because not understanding fully the stab trim functionality. Unlike conventional elevator trim stab trim doesn't change the neutral position of the yoke. You pull or push on the yoke, trim and let go for it to return to neutral. Here he was pushing on the yoke and trimmed, long one 12 secs at that and was still pushing on the stick so the aircraft went in steep dive. Airbus GA is no problem or for that matter even flying because aircraft trims itself. It even applies to alternate law I am talking about within the envelope (you aren't supposed to be outside) which is different only in roll. Besides in Airbus the windsheer and GA could have been done in auto itself, definitely not the time for manual practice.
Last question how do we practice manual handling when emotionally messed up? Because all those hours spent on raw data didn't seem to help.