Originally Posted by
PEI_3721
Moving from 'in principle' training should not replace a bad design (where the consequences of a MCAS event required extreme human performance), to 'in practice', training for systems with residual weaknesses after modification could be accepted
In principle the 737 Max should not have been designed as it was.
But, In practice, after modification, training could provide sufficient safety even if not an ideal design.
Even if we leave aside the "in principle" and the regs, the fundamental problem remains: "no new (sim) training"
was part of the design.
Training could not have substituted for MCAS, could not ever compensate for changed / bad handling characteristics, because training was eliminated
by design.
In fact, even the design of MCAS itself was limited because it had to work with "no new training" (no new warnings, no mention in the manual etc.), this is one reason why (according to e.g.
this article) it all hung off only a single sensor. What was delivered wasn't just a bad design, it was a bad, bodged, design
and no training
by design.