I agree with ya PEI. I am not advocating to train all the pilots to compensate for a really poor design. I also would have liked to have seen Boeing change a few things to satisfy the FAA cert requirements and avoid the nose up pitch characteristic I saw on the graphs.
Moving from 'in principle' training should not replace a bad design (where the consequences of a MCAS event required extreme human performance), to 'in practice', training for systems with residual weaknesses after modification could be accepted
In principle the 737 Max should not have been designed as it was.
But, In practice, after modification, training could provide sufficient safety even if not an ideal design.
I look at the data we have from the two fatal accidents and conclude that system knowledge and some training would have made a lotta difference. Folks that have flown deltas have been shown the high AoA characteristcs that they have. Concorde was the same as the F-102 or Mirage. Plane feels great, but you are going down at 10,000 feet per minute!! Folks flying the VooDoo were shown that the stick got "light" just before you departed. And so forth. Sure, make the planes foolproof and not as fuel efficient or maneuverable. Somehow I do not think that dog will hunt.
My understanding is the 727 and some British planes would never have been certified without a "pusher" or whatever to avoid the pitchup/deep stall condition. The 707 had some trim problems I recall, and was publisized by an accident with the U.S. skating team. Those planes were certified but seems that the pilots had some training to alert them of what would happen if the "systems" failed.
The MCAS and its failure modes were not part of any training or even discussion or reference material. So I maintain my position that even with a poor design that training would have made a difference.