Originally Posted by
safetypee
OK, I’ve read them both now. They’re very general, and I can’t immediately find a point that slots into this thread’s discussion. But if you’ve gleaned such a thing, I suppose I’m ready to talk about it now.
Except one sentence, that jumped out in a huge way:
“Under stress, decision makers fall back on their most familiar responses, which may not be appropriate to the current situation.”
I’m not saying anything about this event - I have no clue what happened and blame no one. I’m only referring to the double-push technique, that came up in the off-shoot discussion, as an example of a common and immediately understood sequence (even with a catchy name) where I think it’s OK to use the automation solution. (To be clear I’ve never flown a Boeing, I’m just going off of that thread’s posts.) It’s a counterexample to my more general point where if you don’t immediately recognize the sequence and solution, it’s necessary to fly the plane, like all the other accidents we’ve been talking about.