yo gums,
After your fortifying festive feasts, I wonder if recent posts in this thread have dented your 'training' armour.
Also there may be more room to manoeuvre now that the changes to 737 Max are known.
Moving from 'in principle' training should not replace a bad design (where the consequences of a MCAS event required extreme human performance), to 'in practice', training for systems with residual weaknesses after modification could be accepted
In principle the 737 Max should not have been designed as it was.
But,
In practice, after modification, training could provide sufficient safety even if not an ideal design.
The important aspect is not where the dividing line is (principle - practice), but who judges it; noting the current differences between regulators after MCAS mods.
These are judgement calls, influenced by underlying beliefs.
What safety credit can be assumed about trained crews in rare or surprising situations, noting that human performance demonstrated in training is unlikely to be what happens in real events - events which in some circumstances the industry cannot afford the experience of even one occurrence.
A distant overview is that not only did the FAA get MCAS wrong, their continuing differences with other regulators suggest their choices are not universally agreed, which in turn does little to restore their world standing.