Sky,
Good post, and you're quite correct, there is plenty more to be found in the FOIs.
I'm posting again, because I want to to attempt to 'square the circle' with Tuc and Chug. I'd also urge all of us to treat all posts here in a polite way - but I'm not a moderator, so feel free to ignore this. I apologise sincerely if I've been the source of any angst - it certainly wasn't my intention.
I agree with Tuc and Chug that some senior RAF officers have, in the past, behaved very badly. I tend to assign their actions to incompetence, arrogance and ambition. I agree that at least some of them have been grossly negligent. I also agree that it has been in their interest to try to 'stove pipe' problems with airworthiness to obscure what they did. And I also agree that they should have been, and still should be, held to account. Their actions caused significant damage to the UK's ability to properly manage airworthiness. Honestly, I am not at all sure that any of their actions would, at this distance, rise to the level off proven criminal offences - I'd leave that to the lawyers, but I respect Tuc and Chug's opinions. I think I've also taken pains to address the 'stove piping' aspect by repeatedly pointing out that this issue is very probably not confined to the ATC glider fleet, and that it's systemic in nature, by which I mean it probably exists across the RAF system, and possibly other services as well.
Where we differ is, I suggest, how these problems might now be addressed. Tuc says (amongst other very good advice) 'just implement the existing regulations' and he's quite right. Chug takes aim at 'the MOD' and calls for an end to 'self-regulation'. I respect these opinions.
My approach has been to focus on the working level - what regs the organisations didn't implement, and why that might have been. Yes, the MOD (at that stage with many RAF officers in previously civilian held positions) did the procurement and should have assured that the 'Type Airworthiness' certification was supported by the required evidence. The 'Continuing Airworthiness Management' (a bit of MAA terminology I support) was firmly in the hands of the RAF. There were failures in both of these.
As an example, why did the RAF not properly monitor their servicing contract for the gliders? Tuc correctly points out that a very good DEFCON was basically ditched without replacement, along with a slew of other regulations. However, in my experience, a headquarters engineer somewhere, probably at SO2 or SO1 level, was the 'customer' for that contract. I was just such an engineer (Lt Cdr), and a big part of our station's second line engineering support was being placed out to contract. This was around 1991. So what did we do?
At that stage of my career, I certainly wasn't familiar with DEFCONs. But what I was familiar with was our Quality Assurance system for all air engineering activity on the Station, uniform or civilian. And that was why our QA Officer (a Lt) stepped forward and proposed how we would incorporate the contractors into that system. And so we did. We inspected their work, checked the qualifications of the guys they had brought on the air station, and blocked the clearances of a couple of their managers, because we felt they didn't have the right skill set. We didn't do this because a VSO told us what to do. We didn't tell any VSOs what we were doing. We didn't even look at DEFCONs. We were just doing bog standard, basic, day to day airworthiness management. We didn't need to look at any regs. So how did a long series of RAF engineering personnel fail to do something like that? Was it that they just didn't know what to do? I find that hard to believe - their training is second to none. Did they try to do their jobs and get told 'not to bother' by a VSO? Honestly, I can't see anyone below a Wg Cdr getting involved in what should have been a routine QA audit on a contractor. Honestly, I can't say.
I'll end with what I think needs to happen (the 'King for a day' scenario), and I'm sure that others will disagree. But anyway: I'd get a the SofS to task the DG Defence Safety Authority (a 3 star) to carry out an independent review of the ATC glider scandal. I'd tell him that while he can involve MAA personnel, his review team must be led by an expert from outside the MoD or the Government, and include reps from the other MoD Safety Organisations to bring a more independent outlook than I'd trust the MAA to do. I'd also tell the DG that his team has to follow the evidence wherever it leads, and if that leads on to other accidents and organisations, so be it.
I'm going to go 'silent and deep' for a while now - I've bored enough people for far too long. If any of you want to carry this on, feel free to PM me.
Best Regards as ever to the aircrew who get into the aircraft every day to do their job. You are never taken for granted, and your lives are precious to each and every professional engineer out there.
Engines