Originally Posted by
salad-dodger
You just post the same utter ****e, again and again and again.
As I'm mentioned as someone who understands SOME of the issues, as far as I can see Chug's post is factually accurate. And given how long this has been going on, quite succinct.
So, too, Engines' post.
I know Engines has researched this case deeply. I take his word that the procurement of the gliders was originally flawed. But in what way?
One key phrase in Chug's post is 'stove-piping'. When procuring anything related to aircraft one does not set up an airworthiness system from scratch. One implements mandated regulations and procedures, and where deviation is allowed there are guidelines. What you do is tailor the system to suit, within boundaries.
We have seen many threads here on airworthiness related accidents, but they too are stove-piped. MoD wants us to think they are unrelated accidents - Nimrod XV230 can't be related to Hercules XV179, they're different aircraft. But what would have prevented both accidents is implementation of consecutive paragraphs on the same page of the mandated regs. The Boards of Inquiry didn't look for this linkage, and nor did anyone above them.
Similarly, the deaths of Red Arrows pilots Burgess and Cunningham, 14 years apart. Burgess isn't mentioned throughout the Cunningham case, but both were killed by a failure to conduct disturbed systems testing. That's not rocket science. Every apprentice has the concept hammered into him/her, and isn't allowed near an aircraft until examined and tested. But my use of 'failure' implies Burgess was the first. I'm probably wrong. But most definitely, on Cunninham it was a flat refusal in the face of certain knowledge of what caused Burgess' death. The warnings had been issued, and those who issued the instruction that prevented disturbed systems testing made a conscious decision to deny the maintainers the wherewithal to implement their training, resulting in an unserviceable seat being used. That was truly malevolent. It was gross negligence. Frankly, it was manslaughter.
Similarly, Chinooks ZA721 and ZD576, 7 years apart. Far too many recurring failures. And when the Director of Flight Safety pointed out, 5 years after ZA721, that they were still recurring, he was ignored. By the VSOs who later fought the MoD campaign against the ZD576 pilots. Linkages. What was their primary role? Ensure airworthiness. They failed. No, they refused, after being warned by the proper authority. They had a duty of care. They knew exactly what they did. Gross negligence. Manslaughter.
Cunningham was a recurrence, and so too the gliders. The same flat refusal to implement regulations. Very few actually say to you 'Don't implement the regs'; and those who do are usually non-engineers who have been permitted to self-delegate airworthiness approval. (See 2003 RN Sea King ASaC mid-air and 2 of the Board's 3 main contributory factors. The risks had been identified and contacts let to mitigate. He cancelled them, and ignored that the risks still had to be mitigated). Initially, these people are easy to deal with: 'Please state in writing what regs I must ignore, and what I use in their place'. But that only works once, as you'll immediately be 'encouraged' to find a job in a non-air systems part of MoD. Colleagues see what happens and.... Again, that is malevolent. But what most do is simply deny you resources and wherewithal, often through an anonymous committee or minor screening meeting. Their first target is always 'airworthiness' money, as it's an intangible. It doesn't generate a 'due-in' on their stock computer, so must be a waste of money. In the Cunningham case, a simple change of maintenance policy that ostensibly saved money, but at the expense of safety. Why did no-one step in and point out that maintainers would now have to sign for something they knew hadn't been proven serviceable? And what is even more malevolent is the cover-up, blaming the company for not providing information, when they've already provided it and the RAF has used it to produce 13 training films. People MUST have known the audit trail was being torn up, and this outright lie perpetuated in court. That's the same team and management chain responsible for gliders, and just another way of expessing the same problem that Engines describes.