Originally Posted by
FullWings
And that is the nub of it and why this thread exists at all.
There is a tendency to drift towards the unquestioning following of SOPs and that there is only one way (my way) of dealing with an issue that gives a positive outcome. There are very, very few circumstances that require immediate action with no real time to think about it first (high-speed RTO comes to mind). Although an engine failure seems like a simple thing with clearly defined actions as a result, even this is not as straightforward as it seems.
One of our training documents is a 40-page interactive book covering some of the engine failure possibilities and ways to deal with them. OK, you say, but to keep things simple, the manufacturers have distilled all that into a few choices that are simple to action in a time of high workload. Absolutely true, I say, but you can still end up in a cul-de-sac if you rush in blindly without due mental process. Imagine you go through a flock of birds after takeoff (does happen) and there are a few pops but the engines are still running. Shortly after that you notice the EGTs are high on both and then there is a fire warning on one engine. SOPs say to shut it down and fire the bottle but is that wise *right now*, especially as it is still producing thrust? What are we going to do if we get a fire warning on the remaining engine?
I’m sure everyone reading this would pause and reassess the situation, should it happen to them, but if you continually beat people over the head to follow SOPs no matter of any indication to the contrary, it might lead to a sub-optimal outcome. The fate of the French Concorde was sealed when a running engine was shut down due to a fire warning, leaving not enough thrust to stay airborne. Yes, it was probably going to crash anyway but that action made it a certainty.
Fullwings you speak my language!
At the risk of thread drift, there is a problem arising in some training 'cultures' which I think stems from being too anxious to pitch every procedure at some primitive pilot (the lowest common denominator) who has somehow infiltrated the system and is waiting to screw up.
We see policies written that forbid pilots to ever reset a circuit breaker unless it is specifically called up in the QRH. No more making one reset if you would like to have the system, but instead write it up for the engineers to reset and too bad if you are at a non-engineering port. No more attempting one recycle of some 'sticky' valve - write it up and ground the operation pending an engineer hitting it with a rubber hammer.
As for running an engine beyond its 5 minute limit if it's really needed to ensure adequate performance, or making a spit-arse turn to a reciprocal runway and landing overweight with an uncontained fire and not completing the full checklist - heaven forbid it should ever be suggested, let alone practiced in the simulator.
The result of this mentality is we have carefully scripted simulator checks where everything is rehearsed well before the event. I have actually had candidates ask me for the exact test sequences, approaches, route etc 14 days in advance of a simple Instrument Rating renewal. They arc up when I reply with a copy of the official test form and delay notification of the route until 24 hours in advance. Yet their masters often hit them with short notice roster changes or off-schedule charters and they cash their pay cheques cheerfully enough.
In some jurisdictions it seems gone are the days of non-jeopardy LOFT exercises where crews were encouraged to step outside their comfort zone. Now, it's all about ticking the boxes on the form.