Reflecting on the report, and what has been said already, it strikes me that there were really two distinct "incidents" here. Events leading up to the MLG being damaged, and those after. The report covers the former reasonably, and it is clear that the pilot should not have been flying that sortie, and was likely distracted by his failure to complete AAR successfully, and the consequent abandonment of the entire sortie.
However, from the point of the initial impact onwards, it seems to me there was almost a separate series of events. The cause of the impact was temporarily irrelevant, as The aircraft was airborne, flyable, and in communication. The pilot was clearly still in control, and seems to have been calm and rational. Indeed he seems to have been the only one to question the use of the checklist. Twice. Yet the investigation seems content to skip over this by saying his questions werent answered "directly". It would seem in fact that they were ignored, leading to a plan which had misadventure written all over it. Whilst we now know that a controlled ejection might also have been unsuccessful (indeed uncontrolled in the circumstances), it was at the time a dramatically lower risk scenario. The report doesnt mention whether the pilot was experienced at taking the wire, but even if he was, the margin for error with an aircraft with a severely damaged MLG is vanishingly small.
It has been a while since I read an accident report where so many holes lined up so perfectly, and yet the investigation manages to sound rather complacent.