This may be disappointing, but I can assure you that the photographs taken out on the ground in the GDR were clear and in focus. The decision to blur them was a policy decision to try to hide our capabilities from the Sovs. I don't think it did! As to what went on on the ground, the following is an extract from some notes about a (relatively) normal day for an Air Tour in the mid-80s - Air Tour being normally an RAF officer and WO (Master Aircrew) plus a cpl driver who could have been RAF or army.It was almost impossible to come up with a first sighting of a major item of equipment such as an aircraft, missile or radar system, since virtually all of them had been observed by other means whilst under development in the Soviet Union, but the essential item that the Mission could bring to the intelligence solution was the close-up, or, particularly, the view from underneath. On aircraft, the images of flying controls, pods, weapons and antennae were something that only observation from ground level could obtain. Military attaches were another source of such imagery, but they were severely constricted by their diplomatic status as to where they could go, whilst the Mission could play the "risk versus gain" game without such concerns. In addition, unlike the basically static images that could be derived from satellite imagery of new aircraft or weapons in the Soviet Union, Mission tourers could observe and record them in use, seeing tactics, manoeuvres and weapon delivery as it happened. As with all elements of the overall intelligence "picture", the art and success comes with an analyst's ability to link together information from a number of sources to complete the "big picture".
One of these occurrences came during a visit to Altenburg Soviet airfield, between Leipzig and Dresden. This was the home of a regiment of Flogger J strike/attack aircraft, and was a popular destination for air tours as it seemed to be one of the higher grades of unit that introduced new weapons and tactics. We were able to establish ourselves in a good OP and then heard a fairly large number of aircraft taking off - we were at the landing end of the airfield. About 40 minutes later, a stream of Flogger
Js came into land, many of which were carrying a new (to us) pod of some sort on the wing pylons. In good weather we were able to get good pictures of each of them on the approach, and, in our log, record the bort (side) number, weapon/pod fit and, more usefully, the exact landing time. Unable to decide what was going on, we waited, and, within a couple of hours, had a repeat performance, but, this time, were able to image the strange pods to see that they now had openings in the bottom, revealing empty interiors. Interestingly, we could also see that the bort numbers were landing in exactly the same sequence as in the morning. On returning to West Berlin, we commented on this in the Highlight Report which was circulated around the various intelligence units in Berlin, including the US and French Missions, and, by the next morning were receiving numbers of requests for further information.
This event led to a very useful series of discussions and reports. The Altenburg Floggers in the first wave had flown to the main Soviet air-to-ground range at Gadow Rossow, to the north-west of Berlin. There they had flown a rehearsal for the afternoon live demonstration of a coordinated attack using the new pods, which turned out to be a form of bomb dispenser. This activity was observed by an air tour from the US Mission, and had also featured in the overwatch of the signals intelligence (Sigint) and radar units. When all the images from the tours, plus the description of tactics used at the range, were put together with the radar plot and the identification of individual aircraft with their weapon fit or new pod, plus the ability of the Sigint units to tie together bort number, weapon/pod fit and therefore callsign from the accurate landing times that we were able to provide, a first-rate report was able to be produced.