Originally Posted by
Capn Rex Havoc
G'day runway 16 (all bold really?),
I actually had that scenario many moons ago flying a 717 to Aye. A deaf pilot, landed gear up, didn't see the lights from the tower, we diverted to AS, then half way there, were told they towed the c210 off the runway so we went back.
I have had many other such decisions to make in my career, lots of warries to tell over the bar, like flying to Harare (elevation 5000 ft), at night, in an A330, half the runway closed, half the lights not working, one reverser in op, doing a VOR approach with 15 kts tail wind, and then on final the VOR failed( below min fuel to divert to Lusaka)
or delayed ex Dubai due weather in an a380, taxiied for 2 hours, amber on the FMS fuel gauge predictions for Amsterdam, get airborne, lightning strike on departure, continue to AMS, FMS showing 6.5 Tonnes on arrival, told to hold (unable due min fuel ), AMS had 35K Crosswind, touched down with 6 Tonnes. The beers tasted bloody good that night. (Final reserve was 4.5 tonnes - a go around and return to land burns about 3.5 tonnes)
Any way as good as the above warries are, they distract from my original post query, and interpretation of the AIP. I think Lead Balloon sums it up perfectly - The muppets who wrote this stuff have no bloody idea, and the muppets who are supposed to amend and correct and clarify this stuff are similarly clueless.
Agreed. The AIP has some quite confusing and contradictory statements on this topic which potentially need to be clarified, simplified etc.
But it certaintly isnt the only topic whoever wrote the AIP seems to struggle with in its ability to employ the copy and paste from ICAO PANS-OPS without mucking it up.
