We are still only talking about 2013 - only 7 years ago in the familiar environment of the N Sea.
Can you really be serious that training, checking and SOPs were still inadequate to prevent this accident only 7 years ago?
If that were really the case there would have been far more incidents and accidents since IMC approaches are normal fare for aviation in those parts.
There is a very thin line between a normal flight and a disaster, as pilots we SHOULD all know this. When we move away from SOPs in the cockpit or when the SOPs are flawed this line becomes thinner (not to mention the many other reasons). What I'm saying here is as pilots we get away with it, when we are close to disaster and we don't even know it. Which leads to us thinking if there hasn't been an accident for a while then its all working fine.
This is why there should be endeavours to find out why it happened and then to mitigate. Why do experts make mistakes? I think its a good question.
Crab, the OP manuals I work are updated once a year, sometimes two with many smaller directives in-between. We are constantly improving, learning, moving forward to keep safety at the forefront. I suspect CHCs ops manuals are nearly unrecognisable now than before this accident.
Flying is not that black and white.