● The operator’s SOP for this type of approach was not clearly defined and the pilots had not developed a shared, unambiguous understanding of how the approach was to be flown.
● The operator’s SOPs at the time did not optimise the use of the helicopter’s automated systems during a Non-Precision Approach.
CRAB - in your haste to crucify the crew you are missing these two elements of the findings!!
The performance of the crew in this instance can be easily inferred from the rest of the report. However, nothing is ever as simple as "Pilot Error" unless the man on the sticks shouts "Geronimo" and pushes the cyclic forward to hit the sea.
SOPs, Limitations and Automation Management have to be defined holistically to ensure that on those days where any one of us may be underperforming, we may stand a chance of getting away with a howler with little more than a bruised ego.
It is this "Holistic" approach to systems and procedures management that is the issue here. After this accident a lot of good quality progress was made by all the major players in this area. In the defence of the Operators, some of the vital information necessary to determine solid procedures for the management of automation was missing in the OEMs available data. Much of this has now been addressed.
CRAB the reason why other posters object to your one dimensional response to this accident is because much of the progress that has been made since would not have been possible if we all took your view.
In the black and white pages of an AAIB report ity is oh so easy to see the mistakes others make. Its a little harder to soul search and ask if it could have happened to you. However, in doing so you stand a chance of unlocking the mysteries that surround accidents and make real progress. It is for this reason that when I am asked what the number one quality of an Instructor should be, I reply, empathy! Without it we are blinded by ego and prejudice.
DB