aa777888,
points (1) and (2), are designed so that the trim will not continue to run with a false AoA input, thus a crew will not have to manage an extreme uncontrollable situation.
The crew can still suffer a trim runaway, as with all 737s. Your previous training would have demonstrated this situation, but given recent events and knowledge of simulator deficiencies there could be doubt if the procedure will work. Thus the changed emphasis to inhibit trim quickly - and clarification of 'continuous' the drills.
The draft checklist changes and training, point (3), are @
https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_d...v_17_Draft.pdf and
https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attac...-R3-8-3-20.pdf
checklist changes page 24 -
Several of the new drills are debatable -
Speed Disagree, no reference to cross checking Std By ASI, only go to Unreliable Airspeed.
Or 'if
Unreliable Airspeed is suspected' - drills for pitch power; but how would crews form their suspicion. A non English speaker could have difficulty with this, what would a third party sim instructor recommend. Compare this scenario with AF447 - pitch-power action without first establishing the situation.
Training; why demonstrate the MCAS function which is supposed to be in background, not noticed by the crew, making the aircraft the same as the NG - thus why differences training.
Why demonstrate MCAS near and during a stall, as above the Max apparently stalls the same as the NG, MCAS resets itself; focus on this during a stall demo has significant risk of negative stall training.
Speed Trim Fail alert requires no action; the alert can mean the system is or is not working (MCAS or STS fail, but which one), or these could still work depending on the hidden logic of single AoA computation (when is an alert not an alert - when it annunciates the system status except when it doesn't).
,
re-reading the scant FAA description suggests that assumptions in this are incorrect. Hence the need for clear explanation from the manufacturer,
particularly what is expected of the crew if an alert is shown.
A Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation demonstration - fly with the AP engaged, AP disengages check
STAB OUT OF TRIM is annunciated, the condition has to be 'terminated in a landing' …… what else could be expected.