Originally Posted by
RetiredBA/BY
I still believe both of the crashes would, could have been avoided by a reasonably trained crew, aware of the function of the stab. trim cutout switches. covered at Seattle on my 737 course on about sortie 4.
Exactly. And, given the poor performance of the original MCAS design, a theory proven more than once by US-based pilots.
Looking at the NPRM:
To address the unsafe condition, the FAA proposes to require four design changes:
(1) installing updated flight control software (with new control laws) for the FCC operational program software (OPS)
(2) installing updated MDS display processing computer (DPC) software to generate an AOA disagree alert
(3) revising certain AFM flightcrew operating procedures, and
(4) changing the routing of horizontal stabilizer trim wires.
Clearly (4) would not have made any difference in the two accidents. Of the remaining three changes, how much difference would they really have made? (1) might have forestalled the inevitable, because ultimately the system still will fail from time to time. (2) is a nice to have. They already had AFM procedures that worked, so how much value is there in (3)?
Bottom line: where are the updated training requirements? That's the only thing that's going to work.