I see that nobody has commented on the late seventies
US Congress report on Sea Control in the Atlantic.
Then, as now, NATO was divided by a large Ocean, and things such as reinforcement convoys and amphibious forces would be at risk of Soviet (and Warsaw Pact?) air and submarine attack. This drove NATO and UK weapon and platform development. A relatively recent (post 2000) development was the low frequency towed array sonar - which really needs to be used in conjunction with active dipping sonar - hence the Type 23 frigates that were refitted with 2087 sonar also received upgrades so they could operate the Merlin. However 24/7 dipping demands multiple aircraft, from a large deck.
I also started a thread to discuss it -
here. Note the authoritative replies from ECMO1 - a former US Navy Naval Flight Officer with extensive carrier experience operating the EA-6B Prowler:
...the primary mission for the CV/CVN in the North Atlantic was not ASW (it was an additional role) but rather AAW to prevent the Backfire/Bears from attacking the convoys. The A-6/A-7s were the organic tankers to push the F-4/F-14 CAP stations out to a range to shoot the archer, not the arrows. Obviously, those roles swapped a bit when you started facing a surface threat or got close enough to land to start contemplating strikes against those Soviet Naval Air Arm airfields.
Defence in depth is for winners.