parkfell, #65
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- 800 per manual ?)
But what will we learn, individually or collectively; how, why, apply …
I doubt that your 'no doubt' can be proven; individual opinion, judgement, interpretation of CVR etc.
Also we cannot tell what options the crew had, what they saw or believed; as above a drift into 'error', 'blame' is very difficult to avoid - because we are human.
A skill in aviation is to avoid the corner points; go around, diversion. What we might see as a corner position now, could have been a landing opportunity to the crew at the time, but with hindsight it wasn't.
White Knight, TT,
CRM, HF, etc. It is difficult to define these terms, thus they can mean different things to different people - cultures, context.
Nowadays investigators and regulators (mis)use these terms as an alternative for 'error', and accident reports are overwhelmed with 'failures' in CRM, HF, monitoring. What is overlooked is to ask why.
It is difficult to prove that CRM, etc, are a benefit; whether or not, we dare not consider otherwise, thus why are these factors reported in accidents; - an inability to explain human performance.
The weakness, the issue to be learnt, is that the regulations and accident reports expect these safety initiatives to work all of the time. People are surprised that crews don't behave as excepted, that humans are human and occasionally behave contrary to expectation, thus 'blame' the crew.
CRM, monitoring, yes, but they only work until they don't, then, unfortunately we seek to 'blame' someone.