PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.
Old 8th Aug 2020, 10:51
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safetypee
 
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Infrequent 789,
You appear to misunderstand the effects of 'g' and AoA; or is it memory

The need to change the magnitude of MCAS trim would more likely be an effect of Mach - difficult to replicate in a wind tunnel.
Although described as a trim increase, this could have been a larger value, or an earlier trigger point with an extended duration or change of trim speed.

The aerodynamic intrigue with MCAS is why AoA was required at all. Existing technologies could manage low speed situations ( speed trim ), and Mach trim at higher speed. The Max modifications appear to be similar to the military 'Leading Edge Extension' which involves AoA and vortex management, but implemented with full FBY technology.

The initial, single MCAS trim input is variable; modified system: -

"The MCAS flight control law becomes active when the airplane exceeds an AOA threshold that varies depending on Mach (airspeed). If activated by a high AOA, MCAS moves the horizontal stabilizer at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second, which is the same trim rate as Speed Trim with flaps down. The magnitude of the MCAS command is a function of Mach. At higher airspeeds, flight control surfaces are more effective than at lower airspeeds. Therefore, a smaller MCAS command at higher airspeeds has the same effect as a larger MCAS command at lower speeds. At low Mach, when the stabilizer has lower effectiveness, the MCAS command can be up to the maximum of 2.5 degrees of incremental stabilizer movement. The MCAS flight control law is reset after the AOA falls sufficiently below the AOA threshold." Preliminary Summary Page 23

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