Apologies for another thread drift post. Unlike Chugalug2's father, mine survived to wear the Pacific Clasp on his Burma Star and I hence feel able to play the ball not the man. Also as far I remember TBM's posts are normally measured, if sometimes reflective of the Aussie tendency to give it to you straight.
TBM - (The article is) a wonderfully myopic piece of Pommie bashing
, however, it is a historical view Britons should be more aware of. In December 1941 Britain was on a knife edge of survival as the Battle of the Atlantic was beginning to swing back to the Germans, the Battle of Britain a respite, victory at El Alamein was nearly a year away. Defeat could only be stopped by an influx of American manpower and machinery. The Royal Navy had lost more than third of major units it began the war with. Low spending since WW1 meant many ships were worn out and obsolete. Throughout the war British tactics designed to keep down casualties continually frustrated the Americans but were a necessity due to the constraints of available manpower and resources. Churchill like any good war leader was merely accepting reality in private while attempting to maintain morale in public, don't forget Churchill had expressed the intention to fight on and recover the UK from German occupation if necessary but I am sure realised the remaining Empire couldn't or wouldn't do it. Territory can be regained, lives can't.
RN 1939 Losses end '41
Capital Ships 15 5
Carriers 7 4
Cruisers 63 13
Destroyers 184 59
Submarines 60 36
Total 329 117
Doesn't include 4 RCN/RAN losses and new builds.
Until it flip flopped in the 1920s Britain expected its ally Japan to protect its colonies and protectorates in the Indian and Pacific Oceans - don't forget the USA planned how to fight an Anglo-Japanese enemy. In November 1941 Churchill's policy was still one of deterrence, using limited available resources to persuade Japan not to enter the war. He knew Britain could barely fight a war on one front never mind three (Europe, South Asia, Pacific) and frankly India, Ceylon and Burma were more important and had the manpower. He was reaching out to Stalin as there was no formal co-operation - the outcome of the Russian front was uncertain.
In December the US's recent forced entry into the war had changed things but as that had come via a Japanese attack he had, naturally, to ensure the Pacific didn't become the main or sole focus or Britain might cease to exist. Just before the Arcadia Conference the RN had just lost two of its three major units in the Indian/Pacific theatre, HMSs Prince of Wales and Repulse, and was to lose the remaning one HMS Exeter not long after. This is reflected by General of the Army George Marshall's views, who though sympathetic to Britain's need for war materiel before the Pearl Harbor attack was deeply concerned that the US was transferring what it would shortly need itself to a lost cause.
Fleet Admiral Ernie King, brilliant though he could be, was a rampant anglophobe, and had spent his entire career studying how to fight a war against Japan. Roosevelt had to overrule him to make him accept the British Pacific Fleet even when the resources were available. His initial reponse to the U-Boat war was a disaster as he refused to accept British advice on convoys and seaboard blackouts until losses were unacceptable. Don't forget there was a strong belief among many leading Americans, including George Marshall, that the conduct of the war should hamper any attempt by Britain to regain its colonial positions. By the time the resources were available the US didn't want them all - my father's ship, HMS Newcastle, reached NSW only to be sent away as surplus to requirements.