Progress in Improving its Processes . . . indeed
Keesje, that's a great find (and plus, the full 19-page GAO document as well).
First, some context and, to be followed with an observation trying to answer the question about where have all the rulemakers gone?
The GAO report is testimony provided by a Ph.D. with the title (in 2017) of Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues. (If anyone is curious GAO is an agency within the legislative branch of the U.S. federal government - not part of the Executive branch.) The occasion was a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety and Security. Although this SLF has not drilled back almost a decade to locate and then to read (and study) the roots of all this - the roots are worth noting. In the 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act, the Congress directed FAA to charter "two aviation rulemaking committees--one to improve certification processes and [the second] to address regulatory consistency[.]" For the uninitiated with regard to U.S. legislative methods and terminology the 2012 legislation reauthorized the FAA -- meaning it provided legal authorization for other Congressional enactments to appropriate funds -- for Fiscal Years 2012-2015 (enacted on Feb. 14, 2012, as Public Law 112-095).
Now, in the aftermath of the 737 MAX debacle and as the world airline sector continues to reel from an intersecting aftermath of a global pandemic, in both the House and the Senate, Committee leaders as well as senior staff members are hoping to re-corral the horse, and not just undo the harms evidently done to the certification process but also reset it so as to better prepare for the near-term future and somewhat further as well. But, are they delving back into those two 2012 Reauthorization legislation reports? -- and to examine the potential biases or other limitations of the individuals who served on those two "rulemaking" committees? -- and to cut into how FAA addressed the output of those committees (other than re-reading the 2017 GAO report?) -- and perhaps most rhetorically, requesting the input of the CAAs from other principal aviation sector countries to gain their perspective? Would it be unprofessional to say I have my doubts? -- Congress most typically is not where one looks for the most rigorous expertise and respect for authoritative input (as opposed to smoothest lobbyists).
GAO reports can be very interesting (thanks again for posting it keesje) and often stand as reminders, in the U.S. Congress there is no such thing as an equivalent to "the pointy end of the airplane."
Bonus swipe at Congressional relevance: one would have thought from all the many acronym-like named groups part of CAPSCA, the ICAO-affiliated conglomerate group which was supposed to deal with preventing a global pandemic, that such a thing as is actually happening worldwide could not happen. Is Congress going to examine that part of the crisis threatening to wreck the world airline sector? (CAPSCA is: . . . ..Collaborative Arrangement for the Prevention and Management of Public Health Events in Civil Aviation. Perhaps there is a hidden nose-dive feature in this "Arrangement" which also happens not to be in either an FCOM or training, and there certainly was no simulation for stopping the first outbreak before it could grow into a pandemic.)