Wide-scale change to ODA in the works??
In the tragic aftermath of the two accidents, public scrutiny of the ODA process was growing in intensity well before the DOT I.G. report. A main example was the NYT article a few months into this saga which reported in some detail how Boeing had pressed the Congress to maintain if not expand its free-rein in the process, as part of the FAA Reauthorization.
Yet count this SLF as one who finds greater momentum for structural change in the I.G. report than before, if for no reason other than the fact both Congressional committees are preparing legislation to revisit what was done in the reauthorization bill. So the history about non-compliance, in this context, sets the stage for the more dramatic problems revealed by the two accidents. For convenience of thread readers for whom a close reading of the report is unwanted, here is the segment on past issues, from the section "Results in Brief" (p 9-10):
"in 2015, we reported on FAA’s lack of a risk-based oversight approach to ODA. In addition, FAA identified concerns regarding the quality of ODA certification documents that needed to be addressed. In December 2015, FAA and Boeing signed a Settlement Agreement, and Boeing paid a civil penalty of $12 million regarding violations of Boeing’s quality control system and insufficient certification documents. FAA’s subsequent oversight found that Boeing has not yet resolved all the identified issues, including improving its identification and resolution of the root causes of non-compliances with FAA requirements. During this time period, Boeing and FAA also identified concerns about undue pressure on ODA personnel at multiple Boeing facilities, which culminated in FAA issuing a formal compliance action against Boeing in November 2018. Boeing’s response to this compliance action remains ongoing."
What's the most valid way to reconfigure the ODA process? - that's a hard topic. The G.C. memo appended to the I.G. report notes that as part of FAA's other corrective initiatives, it is giving attention to SMS (Safety Management System) as well as "Just Culture" -- this is separate, per the General Counsel, from what may be in the works with regard to ODA.
But then Mr. Bradbury continues and notes that FAA is "developing a new policy to ensure appropriate FAA oversight of ODA programs". (p47) In that segment the G.C. invokes specifically the Administrator's statement that delegation is a privilege and not a right, and further notes that the new policy will take account of what Mr. Bradbury calls "any history of undue influence on ODA decision-making." And the policy also will take account of the additional work to be done by the I.G. as well as input from a group called the Expert Review Panel, as established by the reauthorization bill (section 213). As a kind of "watch this space" item the G.C. memo points out that "FAA expects to have the draft policy prepared for public comment in the coming months." Certainly a wealth of aviation safety community people and groups will anticipate offering such comments.
Beyond those steps, the G.C. writes that FAA is establishing an ODA Office to be part of its Aviation Safety Organization and gives some context for what it will do and how it will be initiated.
I don't know what the reauthorization bill actually says about the Expert Review Panel, and "politics" always can intrude on what otherwise would be a very technically virtuous process, but even as I am reading the detailed sections of the I.G. report closely, it sure seems as if some very serious people at FAA are motivated plus devoted to right the ship.