PAXboy, #15,
From very dated experiences, the FAA stood apart from other authorities, though some who attempted to mimic them had similar traits.
Roots are deep and long lasting. The critical difference was with trust - partnership; the FAA process had an inbuilt need to be the dominating, rule-based culture, which organisationally lacked (or constrained) common sense, innovation, lateral thinking.
The individual engineering and piloting abilities were high, very capable people; you felt sorry for them. In their own fields world leaders, but restricted 'by the the book'.
Professionally it was possible exchange informal views with these 'experts', however associations and friendships were challenged by over-shadowing officialdom.
The majority of world-wide regulation and approvals were founded on mutual respect, interchange of expertise, guidance, but never outside the final formal approval process - rarely rejected because everyone understood the rules, interpretations, and the 'line in the sand', which had been agreed beforehand.
The objective was to be safe, opposed to the FAA need to tick boxes and meet the rules.
The US process absolved the FAA from ultimate 'responsibility'; the law-makers made the rules, if the rules were inappropriate then that's not the FAA's fault. So as long the FAA could show that the rules were met, then they were covered - job done.
Its now ironic that the law-makers are reporting on the FAA, an element in a process for which they, the assessors, hold governing responsibility. Not likely to blame themselves, thus a 'soft' report without recommendation for structural change - not to damage themselves, their image, their culture.