Originally Posted by
vilas
There are simply no split second decisions for any failures. If anyone told you that it's exaggeration. Most accidents/incidents are attributed to pilot error. The long list of human factors responsible for errors makes it tempting for the technology to attempt to remove the human. Accidents happened many times more without automation. All weather CAT3 operations, reduced vertical separation to increase the number of aircaft using an airway is just not possible without automation. And with human presence if accidents cannot be avoided then it's a question of can they be less without them with full automation. B737 max failures are not at all because of automation. It's because of trying to match a competitor, fitting a more fuel efficient engine on to an unsuitable airframe. Then trying to correct the problems that arose through software without redundancy and selling it in immoral haste. Don't compare that.
There are no split-second decisions to make, at all? No novel events not foretold by an AC, flight manual, or computer system? I know the NTSB likes to blame pilots virtually straight away--this I have been told by a few experienced pilots here on PPRUNE, and the same case was attempted to be laid against Sully. I cannot comment on actually flying a B737, but I can guarantee automation failure and other computer-based factors were at play there--just like the detrimental idea of using Lithium-Ion batteries in the 787 was a grave error. I can tell from the information I have access to, which is not all Boeing has, that the software was buggy for the 737 Max and the issue here was system design. There are other systems error examples like Qantas Flight 72, where a malfunction in the ADIRU was found; Lufthansa Airbus A321, had autopilot issues, and when the autopilot was turned off--the nose dropped. The Boeing 737 Max' MCAS did indeed malfunction. Now I think we all know the claimsof William Langewiesche--while not the pilot his father was (author of Stick and Rudder) he is still a pilot, so I did read his statements very carefully. There is ample evidence Boeing downplayed the serious issues with MCAS, the FAA did not look hard enough, and now, we have disparate experts trying to blame the pilots; it is easy for us non-pilots to blame the pilots, but I do know wit years of experience in software engineering, AI/ML research, and talking to seasoned pilots the narrative is not so clear-cut. Sure there are pilot errors, and they get found out, but to blame the pilots and undermine Boeing's sloppy work in the engineering of the upgrades to the 737 Max does a great disservice. These computer systems are not infallible either.