Interesting article, published 19 June, on warontherocks by Yun Sun, Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center
. He seems to think the incident wasn't premeditated and is partly the result of increased Chinese paranoia in the wake of Covid-19 and a feeling India was stabbing them in the back.
China’s top South Asia experts were not consulted until roughly ten days after the beginning of the standoff. The late involvement of the policy community suggests that the standoff was not based on advanced planning.
China’s Strategic Assessment of the Ladakh Clash
Conclusion
The Ladakh clash should not have been a surprise. Similar events have been happening along the disputed border between China and India for years, but only the few most heated ones make the news. Beijing believes India is exploiting a temporary period of Chinese weakness and is responding forcefully as a result. Strategically, it may not help China’s desired goal to keep India neutral. But since Beijing sees a neutral India as untenable to begin with, tactical gains that can bog India down along the disputed border, frustrate New Delhi’s regional and global ambitions, and remind India of the eventual need for compromise may not be the worst case in China’s cost-benefit analysis. Tactically, China appears to be aiming for what it achieved in the 1962 war. Despite what the outsiders might see as China’s mistake, China is unlikely to change its current strategic assessment. China and India will eventually find a face-saving mutual compromise to end the Ladakh standoff, as neither wants a war. However, the unsettled border will continue to destabilize, fester, and brew more clashes down the road.