As Not_ a_Boffin states the BBC omission is about FSS.
Although much of its content was already known or obvious to any one with half a brain (excluding politicians): reading the summary of the NAO report has quite ruined my Friday mood. Makes me very worried about what is in
NOT FOR NAO EYES documents.
Jonathan Beale's BBC story seems to me to be soft pedalling.
Summary Carrier Strike – Preparing for deployment
9 - The Department has been slow to develop the solid support ships which are crucial to operating a carrier strike group. Carrier Strike relies on the sustained availability of munitions and stores, such as ammunition and food. However, the Department has only one ship able to resupply a carrier group, which slows the tempo and reach at which this can be done. It has long been aware that this will restrict the operational freedom of Carrier Strike but has not yet developed a solution. In November 2019, the Department stopped the competition to build three new support ships due to concerns about value for money. It believes this will delay the introduction of new ships by between 18 and 36 months, making it uncertain the first new ship will be operational before the existing support ship leaves service in 2028. The Department will also incur additional maintenance costs while it uses its existing support ship as an interim solution
Should you want to read the report or summary they are available at:
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/carrie...or-deployment/
For those who don't, other "highlights" include:
(Including Crowsnest and F35s as mentioned above)- The new Crowsnest system is 18 months late, which will affect Carrier Strike’s capabilities in its first two years.
- The initial contracted capability will not be available until September 2021, 18 months later than planned
- Further delays mean that it does not expect to have full airborne radar capability until May 2023
- The Department has not yet made funding available for enough Lightning II jets to sustain Carrier Strike operations over its life
- The Department plans to reassess the number and type of Lightning II jets that it needs in the Integrated Review, but its ability to use Carrier Strike will be constrained if it has fewer jets than planned.
- The Department has still not provided the necessary funding for logistics projects and munitions.
- The Department expects to meet its target of declaring initial operating capability for Carrier Strike in December 2020, but with a basic(airborne) radar capability.
- Initial operating capability’ is a single, trained Lightning II squadron (up to 12 jets), able to embark on a joint warfighting mission with appropriate support and maritime protection.
- The Department’s policy ambition for Carrier Strike will be reviewed.
- It will assess the impact of ongoing financial pressures and determine its defence priorities, including whether it can fund all the original roles of Carrier Strike, including supporting amphibious capabilities
- The Department faces investment prioritisation decisions to maintain and enhance the Carrier Strike capability over the longer term.
- The Department has not established a consolidated view of the enhancements that are needed to continue to develop Carrier Strike’s capabilities, or their cost. It will need to make funding decisions in the next 10 years, such as deciding how to replace or extend Merlin helicopters, which are due to go out of service in 2030. These decisions will create added funding pressures at a time when the Equipment Plan is already unaffordable.
- The Department is developing a fuller understanding of what Carrier Strike will cost to operate and support in the future.
- Given the strategic importance of Carrier Strike, we would expect the Department to develop a clear view of support and operating costs. It estimated the additional costs of Carrier Strike in 2017, but this did not include all elements of a carrier strike group. It plans to update this estimate after the first deployment in 2021
- The Department may not have made sufficient provision in later years’ budgets to reflect the full costs of operating Carrier Strike
- Failure to make realistic cost estimates creates a risk that the Department will face increased financial pressure in the future, perpetuating the cycle of short-term decision-making that we have seen in our reports on the Equipment Plan
- The Department needs to ensure the revised governance arrangements establish clear responsibilities and cross-command coherence for developing Carrier Strike.