Originally Posted by
Turnleft080
Originally Posted by
SLF3
This article seems well written and well informed. The interesting (at least to me) element is the simmering tensions between the FAA and EASA, the application of the ISSA process to the Max, and the idea that the Max may return to service and then have synthetic airpseed retrofitted later. Lots in here to disagree on!
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...r-jets-return/
Juan is more or less reading the article from "The Air Current" to the camera without crediting its source, something the publisher of "The Air Current" complained about, IMO with good cause.
Originally Posted by
WillowRun 6-3
But the deception, the overt gaming of the system of certification proofs which may very well lead to civil and even criminal liabilities, is not hard to discern as the letter-writer's most basic concern.
As a lawyer you'll know to be successful at civil and especially criminal law suites hard evidence will need to be produced. So far Boeing has contained the situation by laying the core blame at over reliance on the "industry standard" notion that the pilot would be able to figure out what they were experiencing was a runaway stabilizer trim and apply correction within four seconds, and the attempts at deception were limited to one or two bad actors in the training department. Oh, yes, and they have even had the temerety to suggest that they are immune from prosecution because FAA certified the design! But so far, suitable evidence to undermine these arguments doesn't seem to have been produced. The whistleblower complaints don't seem to hit at the core issue of how MCAS's safety evaluation was botched.