Its always useful to actually read the report before commenting on what the potential contributing factors are. One aspect that hasn't generated a lot of discussion is the flawed procedure of the crew having to listen to two radios simultaneously. I know a lot of crews will split the radio monitoring between them so that the PF monitors and responds to Center and the PM monitors and responds to the CTAF. Good CRM then has the two pilots advising the other of what was said. The "third" radio is the communication between the crew doing SOP calls and reading checklists which can often override the calls from the radio. It is not surprising then that calls get missed such as the Center call to the jet that the Aerocommander was taxiing. The other grey area IMHO is flying the RNP on a VMC day. It is neither a 10 mile straight-in approach or three legs of the circuit. Had the JQ crew done the RNAV and were coming in on a 10 mile straight in approach then possibly the Aerocommander pilot may have seen their landing lights. The problem with the RNP onto 18 is that the aircraft is not lined up with the runway until about 3nm. I don't think that it is useful to state that the AC pilot was a cowboy, he was just doing what bank run pilots do. It is also not the JQ pilots fault because there is a lot happening in the cockpit of a jet and missed radio calls are not infrequent even in CTA at FL350. The problem is the system that requires pilots to multitask in a way that the HF people say is not compatible with human physiology. What the accident at Mangalore shows is that under certain unfortunate circumstances the system will fail and one day it will be an RPT jet in a crumpled heap on the ground or wreckage floating in the water. As I stated earlier if the COO of Jetstar has even the slightest concern about this scenario occurring then he should immediately ban all Jetstar flights into CTAFs.