Originally Posted by
AGBagb
Interesting. I hadn't really thought of the "what if they had just plunked it hard down first time round" question. One to think about; though far beyond my paygrade, such as it is. And, as far beyond my paygrade but in a different direction, a couple of long-time forum members, engineering types, early in the thread drew attention to the lower tubing layout in these particular engines rendering them especially "sensitive" to this horribly hard scrape. ....
No probs AGBagb, and really sorry if I came across a bit "iffy" - but worth thinking about what designers expect, anticipate what their kit may face and what is, seemingly in this case, one hell of an outlier. And yes, my background is both as an Aerospace Engineer and Commercial Pilot (typical case of "jack of 2 trades - rubbish at both???!!!") hence my take on what is expected/mitigated against in Engineering terms. There will probably be good aero/design reasons to keep some stuff low in the engines - even if just to ensure a good airflow between the top of the engines and the underneath of the wings - don't know as never worked in that field - but I could see that having an effect on say, cruise performance = cost per seat mile! Also, if they'd initiated the go-around before the ground contact, they may not even have realised the ground contact. Timing and the subsequent human filtering and/or delay in processing the sensory input then making a subsequent decision all goes into the mix - that's if they had realised - but sounds like the Capt was past making rational decisions - again, the CVR transcript could help there, as several have pointed out, in how we gain an understanding of the thought processes leading up to Event 1 and the go-around.
Airbuba is correct too, hence why I said
"may have had a far higher survival rate had it played out to a stop on the ground" - either way, it was going to be a mess, particularly given the apparent speeds involved over the threshold for Event 1. I'd have put survival of an initial pancake at "slim" - I'm just amazed anyone made it out of the second event at all. The Pan Am story shows that, once you've taken a plane outside it's design envelope, you are a bit in the lap of the gods. For Pan Am it worked - for these guys it didn't.
However, PJ2 (and FlightDetent with
"The more we get involved in working the approach, the deeper trap is dug.") have a very salient point which I personally think is behind lots of accidents - and one I have come across ever since I was a "lowly" PPL.
"FOQA/FDM data typically shows a very low non-stable approach to go-around ratio. Despite the data being presented to pilots and management/training alike, breaking through this phenomena has proven difficult." The number of times I have "done the right thing" and thrown an approach away, or held 2 or 3 minutes until the Wx has cleared through before landing - and then been taken to task is absolutely shocking - good CFIs/Instructors/ATCOs even - who have "had a go" when I have "done the right thing" is a real worry and, if my experience is anything to go by, no wonder people instinctively "press on"! Thankfully, I'm an argumentative so-and-so - and my career has never been on the line due to an "event" - so I've ignored the rebuke/insult to my professional approach and done the same the next time.
I think there were more HF elements involved here (see my dit about orbiting B737s on final) but, like the iceberg, we just never hear of those things which go wrong but people escape from - even in this "big brother" world of airlines routinely analysing post-flight data. Much useful info is buried deep below the waterline or just ignored.
Anyway, I'll shut up now - I can be sooooo very boring ....!!!
