PJ2: The message was there, in the rest of your post. In agreement
a) The traditional 1000 IMC / 500 VMC wording occludes things. The target becomes moveable, which makes it harder for a pilot to understand which side of the line he's standing on, in the heat of the moment.
b) There is no practical training, hands-on instruction, on how to throw out a botched approach. Comparison to G/As from DA due to no vis reference springs to mind, the latter effectively wiped out people busting minima. Talking about the decision making here, not the execution.
c) for most of the wrongly stabilized approaches, the situation is actually getting better, converging. Siren's call.
It takes a few approaches that should have been discontinued yet were not for the human element to build sufficient resolve to act properly and on time. Ideally covered during in the F/O phase of one's career. What type of training can be scheduled to overcome this weakness?
The puzzling bit is landing from unstable is not press-home-itis, but rather a denial of having messed up (salvage-itis) and shying away from the unknown. You can only be ahead of the aircraft at one place, and if that place becomes the runway instead of the MISAP HP, it will actually feel safer just to keep aiming for the ground, no matter how improper such mindset is. The more we get involved in working the approach, the deeper trap is dug.
disclaimer: All irrelevant to the PIA tragedy discussed, which is too bizarre to understand given what's known.