Blind use of flight director could have led to crash

[parkfell]

It is not until page 15 does it make clear that the PF flying the first approach was the FO whose experience is not known.

The Captain was very experienced and yet he allowed the shortened route to occur which was the start of the incident. It must have been at the back of his mind that it was going to be interesting?

The U/T approach radar controller also gets a mention (in dispatches) which I am sure has turned out to be a valuable lesson in aircraft performance.

Failing to set the MCP Alt window to the G/A platform on final approach was a critical event. The FO workload would be HIGH and Situational Awareness LOW. Understanding the FMA is critical. G/A.....TOGA displayed???
Speculation ~ the last time a two engine G/A was flown by the FO would have been on the type rating course??
Just why the Captain allowed the situation to deteriorate to the actual point where he took over is a matter for conjecture.....
Rich in CRM especially for MCC/APS courses and probably for junior *birdmen*on initial type rating courses.

The transcript of the CVR would have been most revealing.

The Aerodrome Controller instructed a Go Around iaw MATS part one instructions. He used his initiative as he did not like what he saw.
Is it to harsh to compare the ATCO actions at Bristol to the Aerodrome Controller lack of actions in Karachi?

Note: as gender has not been identified by the AAIB, I have used HE as *’generic gender’ * to refer to either gender or non binary, in these days of political correctness.