Guys,
The reasons for this sad and wholly avoidable episode aren't a 'mystery'. The way to fix this didn't require 'guts', and it didn't need anyone to 'sign it off'. Perhaps I can help explain.
In 2014, the RAF found itself unable to establish whether its Viking and Vigilant fleets were airworthy. They found out because they badly failed at the first hurdle of becoming certified as a 'Continuous Airworthiness Management Organisation' (CAMO) - this new system had been introduced by the MAA some time before. 2FTS were unable to get that certification, as they lacked almost all of the required capabilities, systems and people to do the job. Meanwhile, the Engineering Authority found that it couldn't present a sufficient case for 'Type Airworthiness'. To repeat a point I've made before, the reason that these organisations were unable to do this weren't the 'new' MAA rules (As Tuc and I have often pointed out, the vast majority of the MAA's regulations are clearly derived from previous airworthiness regs.) The reason was a long running failure across all levels and departments to carry out the basic tasks of managing a fleet of military aircraft. These failures happened at all stages, starting with rushed procurement to spend 'in year funds', and continued through into service with a failure to maintain the fleet, including inadequate inspections and surveys of what was going on. It's certainly not a mystery.
In my view, what was even more remarkable was that when the whole thing came to a juddering halt in early 2014, 2FTS had absolutely no idea how serious the situation was and then spent 18 months failing to get a grip of it. To my mind this indicates a systemic lack of understanding of basic airworthiness management at the higher levels of the RAF. Subsequently, wholly misleading press releases and Ministerial statements were made in an effort to hide the seriousness of the situation. Given all this, 'signing off' the fleets wouldn't have required 'guts' - it would have required a moron.
It's been a true scandal, and reflects badly on those who led the various engineering and technical organisations that utterly failed to do a their jobs, which in turn led to children being put at risk in RAF aircraft. One has to hope that lessons have, this time, been actually learned.
Best regards as ever to all those good engineers who have stepped forward since then and done their level best to salvage what they could out of this mess,
Engines