Originally Posted by
krismiler
All we can say for certain at this stage is:
1. They were high and fast.
2. The approach was unstable.
3. The engines scraped the runway.
4. They became airborne again and tried for another approach.
5. They aircraft crashed.
Once the FDR is read we will know what the position of the landing gear was:
1. Selected up the whole time.
2. Selected down but did not extend.
3. Selected down but retracted too early before the aircraft was positively climbing away resulting in ground contact.
4. Which systems were lost and what was the aircraft state afterwards.
Crew actions seem to be the major factor here, and the CVR should prove vital in determining:
1. Were they aware of the height/distance situation in the first place ?
2. Was there a CRM breakdown ?
3. Were they aware that they had a damaged aircraft or if they had contacted the runway at all ?
I was questioning the location of critical components underneath the engine with the Sioux City DC10 in mind, a turbine failure managed to sever all the hydraulic lines due to them being concentrated in a small area. Standard military doctrine is to spread things out, be it soldiers not bunching up whilst on patrol or aircraft parked close together. Unfortunately it appears that aircraft engines don't offer too much freedom in this area.
You don't have the Sioux city lessons learned correct.
The hyd lines were separated apart but so were the high energy bits of the fan. It wasn't so much that the lines were completely severed but more to them bleeding out due to no check valves This stuff is now addressed in the cert rule advisory which also allows design leeway for the stuff Tdracer mentioned above
OK, we may learn something new in this accident, but I prefer to wait for the on-site reports