Originally Posted by
Union Jack
Thoroughly agree with Alfred - the First Sea Lord of the day appoints seagoing Flag Officers on the basis of their perceived overall ability to exercise command at sea, irrespective of their original branch, coupled with their suitability for further promotion. Of the some 14 officers who held the appointment of Flag Officer First Flotilla, Sandy Woodward's appointment at the time concerned, all but one went on to at least Vice Admiral, five went on to Admiral, and one to Admiral of the Fleet. Four, including Admiral Woodward, were submariners.
Jack
Similar to an all arms command in the Army, it is the commander's ability to use all the specialisms available to achieve the objective irrespective of his/her own.
There was to use
India Four Two's phrase 'a more "air minded" officer available' in Vice Admiral Derek Reffell who was FOF3 (responsible for CVs and LPDs), and both a former “Commando Carrier” Captain and a former Commodore Amphibious Warfare (probably more relevant)' he was seen as the obvious choice by some (especially his subordinates). However, as (submariner) Rear Admiral John (Sandy) Woodward (FOF1) was at Gibraltar for Exercise Springtrain ’82 he could get down south with a task group, which he was already commanding, much more quickly. More importantly, he clearly had the confidence of CINCFLEET (and overall Task Force Commander) Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse who was observing the exercise. Before returning to the UK he gave Woodward the order, face to face, that he was to set sail south on 1 April (the day before the Argentine invasion). According to Woodward’s book Fieldhouse later told him he was determined he should command.
Thanks to
Whinging Tinny, I have been listening to Linley Middleton's IWM tapes(.../collections/item/object/80032610 tapes 7 and 8). To expand on what
WT said, he is complimentary about the effectiveness of 1(F) Squadron's contribution (though he thought they were late to the party and that Jerry Pook should have accepted that the sh1tty end of the stick was their lot in life). It's also clear his relationship with Woodward was dysfunctional, he expected Hermes to receive orders by written signal and not verbally through the 'old boys' network' as he says happened. He thought Woodward struggled to understand aviation, what it could and couldn't do and how best to ensure aircraft availability. Conversely, he (LM) seems to have had a real problem with the usefulness submarines and senior submariners. He also pointed out Hermes had effectively been at sea for a year by the end of the war and had a long defects list, something I was previously unaware of. I'm sure the stress resulting from these and other factors must have contributed to atmosphere BomberH and his squadron mates experienced. The negotiations he reports with RAF staff over 3rd line maintenance to allow the purchase of SHARs can't have helped his attitude to the light blue.
This thread prompted me to buy Chris Parry's
Down South which I am in the process of reading and enjoying. He says that there was friction between
Antrim's captain Brian Young (another aviator) and Sandy Woodward and his staff but that Woodward he got on well with those he knew like
Glamorgan's captain Mike Barrow to whose ship the staff transferred. As
langleybaston says in the RAF intelligence thread he was clearly a marmite personality.
In all this I think a phrase quoted by Chris Parry is particularly apposite 'On the actual day of battle, naked truths may be had for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms.'
Written with my historian's cap on - no criticism of those with direct experience or knowledge intended. Assuming State 2 Condition Yankee.