Originally Posted by
Centaurus
Know the feeling. I was being checked out on the Cessna 425 Conquest. On the downwind leg of a left circuit, the chief pilot acting as instructor and at least 1000 hours as pilot in command on type, pulled back the throttle on the left engine against the idle stop. That is not zero thrust. Although initially flying at a safe speed I was unpleasantly surprised at the immediate speed decay and worse still my inability to counter the drag of the fully closed throttle setting.
Turning final towards the windmilling engine I doubted if I had the leg strength to maintain directional control. I remember telling the instructor there was no way I could maintain directional control if he asked for a single engine go around. He said nothing.
It was a struggle to stop it rolling into the dead engine. It was poor airmanship by the instructor and certainly endangered the flight. I didn't mind the simulated engine failure but his failure to set zero thrust as soon as I had identified the dead engine left no margin for mishandling. Frankly it rattled me and I had lots of hours on turbo-props.
It is a pity that ATSB do not adopt the FAA policy of publishing a most probable cause of an accident when there is insufficient evidence to produce an irrefutable cause. At the moment it becomes anyone's guess as we can see by Pprune comments and nothing is learned especially after three years. .
It's happened before, on many different types. People do not want to learn.
Here's another example this time, from a Beech 1900. Power back to flight idle, not zero thrust and they couldn't maintain control... Wash, rinse, repeat...
And what do you notice in the linked report?
Originally Posted by BASI
Since 1992, it was the practice of the operator’s check pilots to simulate one-engine inoperative by retarding the power lever of the ‘failed’ engine to ‘FLIGHT IDLE’. That was contrary to the procedure prescribed in the Federal Aviation Authority-approved Beech 1900D Airplane Flight Manual, and also to that specified in the operator’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority-approved Training and Checking Manual. Reducing power to ‘FLIGHT IDLE’ also had the effect of simulating a simultaneous failure of the engine and its propeller auto-feather system. The simulation of simultaneous inflight failures was contrary to the provisions of the CASA-approved Training and Checking Manual. During each of the simulated one-engine inoperative sequences, control of the aircraft was not regained until the power on the ‘failed’ engine was advanced to the manufacturer’s prescribed one-engine inoperative thrust power setting
So for
8 years they had been intentionally violating their C&T manual and each time, lost control until they set Zero Thrust.
