Australian Flying magazine May-June 2020 published an article by Steve Hitchen on his test flight of the Tecnam P Twenty-Ten at South Port, Q'ld.
Certainly seems a flash looking four seater with upgraded electronics and prestige interior.
The demonstration instructor's takeoff technique was similar to that commonly taught at flying schools on Cessna and other light singles in that the weight is taken off the nosewheel during the takeoff roll by early back pressure on the control wheel.
Steve writes that his instructor advised him to:
"Smoothly and quickly go to full throttle and as soon as you have elevator authority lift the nose so that it's about two inches off the ground and hold it straight with rudder. Around 55 knots the aircraft will start getting light on the undercarriage and will lift off around 60 knots"
For ab initio and even experienced pilots, it would be difficult to judge two inches for the nosewheel to be raised above the runway - particularly at night where nose attitude is difficult to judge. The potential for inadvertently using too much back pressure to raise the nose wheel off the ground early in the takeoff run is that it may cause the aircraft to become prematurely airborne in ground effect before it reaches the recommended takeoff speed. That has its own hazards
With any aircraft it would be better airmanship to stay with the manufacturer's recommended take off technique, rather than the instructors personal technique - in this case playing with lifting the nosewheel two inches clear of the runway during the takeoff run? Unless the takeoff surface is soft or rough why lift the nose-wheel early in the takeoff run when there is no operational need to do so?
The Comet jet airliner was involved in 26
hull-loss accidents, including 13 fatal crashes which resulted in 426 fatalities. Pilot error was blamed for the type's first fatal accident, which occurred during takeoff at
Karachi, Pakistan, on 3 March 1953 and involved a
Canadian Pacific Airlines Comet 1A.
In those days, De Havilland, the manufacturer of the Comet, recommended that during the take off roll the nose be raised at 80 knots and the aircraft allowed to fly off the ground when it was ready - in other words not at a specific rotation speed. The short nose of the Comet made it difficult for the pilot to visually judge nose attitude when lifting the nose at 80 knots - especially at night. It was all too easy to over-rotate. In addition limitation of artificial horizon design often caused the instrument to be unreliable during aircraft acceleration.
. A similar take off technique was used by the RAF on the De Havilland Vampire and English Electric Canberra bomber. The RAF Pilot's Notes for the Vampire F1 stated: "As soon as the aircraft reaches a speed of 60-70 knots IAS, lift the nose wheel just clear of the ground, then at 82-87 knots ease the aircraft off the ground. The date of the Pilots Notes was January 1947. The first flight of the Comet was also in 1947. There was speculation that nose wheel early lift off may have been to cover the case of nose wheel drag build up caused by the nosewheel impacting on slush during the takeoff roll.
Both early accidents were originally attributed to pilot error, as over-rotation had led to a loss of lift from the leading edge of the aircraft's wings. It was later determined that the Comet's wing profile experienced a loss of lift at a high angle of attack, and its engine inlets also suffered a lack of pressure recovery in the same conditions. As a result, de Havilland re-profiled the wings' leading edge with a pronounced "droop", and wing fences were added to control spanwise flow. The Comet takeoff technique was changed following the results of the investigation
It should be remembered that handling techniques are recommended by the manufacturer's properly qualified company test pilots. That includes takeoff and landing. These will normally be incorporated in the aircraft flight manual or AFM. Instructor personal techniques for takeoff and landing that do not accord with the manufacturer's POH could attract the risk of litigation should an accident occur.
If there is no valid operational reason for changing a flight manual recommendation, then be careful what you teach. It could come back to bite you.