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Old 23rd Apr 2020, 13:51
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dagenham
 
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: USA
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Originally Posted by Union Jack
Squire had to contend with the opposition of the Hermes captain, Linley Middleton, to his receiving lengthy signals from Britain on how to use the technology.

The matter was urgent because Squire and his men, uncomfortably quartered in Hermes and flying by old-fashioned map-and-stopwatch navigation methods from her deck, were taking huge risks daily. l@ser guidance would allow them to drop their bombs farther back from the target. In the event they operated without it until Squire’s raid on June 13. They lost four aircraft: three shot down and one damaged beyond repair.

Squire used all his habitual measured calmness to persuade the navy to let him have four replacement RAF Harriers flown directly to the Falklands from Ascension, using air-to-air refuelling. Middleton, a former naval aviator, whom the mild-mannered Squire considered “a bully”, had opposed this too, calling it “a publicity stunt by the RAF”.




Whilst it appears fairly clear that the later, and now late, Rear Admiral "Lovable" Linley Middleton was perhaps not everybody's light blue cup of tea, and appreciating that the wording above is that of an obituarist, it seems that describing someone whose last appointment for over two years immediately before taking command of HERMES was as Director of Naval Air Warfare as "a former naval aviator" is a trifle harsh. As Tecumseh rightly says, "he had a lot on his plate", and I wouldn't dream of describing Air Chief Marshal Squire, or any other former FJ VSO, as a "former aviator".

Jack

The common thread from all three books regarding leadership on Hermes, seems to be a mindset of aircrew planning jollies, seriously destructive interservice or inter ship rivalry, micromanagement or not understanding the capabilities or impact of deicision ( e.g. the photo interpretation example in Pook's book and the risk highlighted in Ward's book - regarding supposed fast jets on the Stanley runway )

Ultimately was this simply a stress reaction in the situation or a common leadership failure. I was surprised given the risk of so many lives that this was not picked up in after action review as the impact was pretty clear in the books, so must have been common knowledge?

Last edited by dagenham; 23rd Apr 2020 at 13:55. Reason: key pigs
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