Originally Posted by
DaveReidUK
The Max can only be certificated if it's on the same TC as all the other 737 variants. There is no way it could be certificated as a new type under current rules.
The 'grandfathered' portion of the cert basis had nothing to do with the MAX problems.
Everything that has been identified as a shortcoming in the MAX has been associated with new (e.g. MCAS) or significantly modified/affected systems (e.g. cable separation for rotor burst) needed to be certified to the latest regulations per the Changed Product Rule.
It's not the cert basis of the MAX that is a problem, it was the execution of the cert.
BTW, I'd bet good money that if you went through
any other aircraft cert (Boeing, Airbus, etc.) with the same fine tooth comb that is being applied to the MAX, you'd find plenty of issues. Cert is done by humans, humans make mistakes and bad assumptions. Certifying a new (or major derivative) aircraft is a big, big job. To do that job perfectly, with no mistakes, bad assumptions or oversights, is basically a statistical impossibility. Most of the time those cert errors don't have a significant effect on safety. Occasionally they do - and that happened big time on the MAX.
My biggest criticism of the FAA over the years has been a horrible tendency to focus on minutia at the expense of the big picture (e.g. "missing the forest for the trees") - and EASA is just as bad. On the MAX, I watched them do this with "Uncontrollable High Thrust" - UHT. Both the FAA and EASA didn't just look at UHT, they dissected it to the Nth degree - far more than they did even on the 787 - even though UHT has
never resulted in a fatal accident. Boeing probably spent more time/resources addressing UHT on the MAX they they did on any other Propulsion related issue. Had the FAA spent 10% of the time looking at MCAS that they did UHT, it would never have been certified in that configuration but instead they spent all their time staring at the tree...