just revisiting this thread:
in amongst the responders there is a lot of useful input.
Toodogs : you hit the nail on the head regarding temperature dewpoint spread. Less than two degrees difference high probability of reduced visibility,
less than one degree fog / cloud reduced visibility.
PoppaJo: Alternates, after two missed approaches divert to Weipa, 81 nm West, multiple approach aids and procedures,
low MDA's and circling minima, PAPI lights etc and no terrain problems.
Sheppey: Rain affected windscreen, no wipers, RainX will clear most precipitation if you are above 50 kts.
Amber or Yellow lens glasses (night driving shooters / low vis mining ops) will also give an edge with contrast and available light in bad weather.
Crosswhinge: NDB approach with letdown on inbound turn.
Historically, particularly with a SE weather flow, one becomes visual inbound before reaching MDA. A visual approach to RWY 30 is usually possible.
SMS7777: Microbursts. I have personally encountered them at both LHR and Weipa
Lockhart River aerodrome has significant terrain to the West and South of the field, and terrain to the North.
As with most communities there is a significant communications tower (580') near the circuit area.
This aerodrome does not lend itself to circling approaches and has a published No Circling restriction to the Sth and SW of the strip.
The original GPS RNAV procedure for rwy 12 was dangerously close to terrain and
after the Metro crash the approach was realigned to clear some terrain.
The original approach was designed in accordance with applicable standards but did not include a common sense profile.
I have 20 years experience at YLHR and it's weather problems.
I have years of experience in East Timor, Qld Gulf Country, PNG, Bougainville and Solomon Islands.
I am not an armchair expert commenting on something of which I have no experience.
In closing, I note that there was no post impact fire, given that the Titan has two turbocharged engines
that would have had red hot turbos ready to ignite any fuel from ruptured fuel lines.
Was there a double engine failure resulting in a glide approach hence the extremely low altitude at impact?
Was the GPS reset to the aerodrome reference point or was it still in approach mode?
Why wasn't a diversion to an alternate (Weipa?) initiated after the 2nd missed approach?
Recovered data from GPS etc will shed some light on what may have happened.
Lets wait for the ATSB report which should have better access to the facts than we do.
Mainframe